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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the ways in which clean energy is being governed in India. It 
does so in order to improve our understanding of the potential and limitations of 
carbon finance in supporting lower carbon energy transitions, and to strengthen our 
appreciation of the role of politics in enabling or frustrating such endeavors. In 
particular we emphasize the importance of politics and the nature of India’s political 
economy in understanding the development of energy sources and technologies 
defined as ‘clean’ both through the United Nations Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) and leading international actors. By considering the broad range of 
institutions that exert formal and informal political influence over how the benefits 
and costs of the CDM are distributed, the paper highlights shortcomings in the 
narrow way in which CDM governance has been conceptualized to date. This 
approach goes beyond analysis of technocratic aspects of governance – often 
reduced to a set of institutional design issues – in order to appreciate the political 
nature of the trade-offs that characterize debates about India’s energy future and the 
relations of power which will determine how, and on whose terms, they are resolved. 
 
  
3 
 
Introduction 
 
All countries now face a range of energy challenges in promoting energy security, 
tackling energy poverty and de-carbonizing their economies to address climate 
change. But some countries face the dilemmas and conflicts between these objectives 
more acutely than others. In governance terms, India presents a particularly 
challenging case for domestic energy planners and international climate policy 
advocates alike. India is the fifth largest greenhouse gas emitter in the world and 
projected to become the third largest emitter by 2015 (IEA 2007). The majority of 
India’s emissions are produced by the energy sector (MoEF 2010), yet the carbon 
intensity of India’s economy is around half that of China and lower than the US. 
Moreover, the country’s low per capita emissions are projected to remain below the 
2004 world average up to 2031 (MoEF 2009a). Indeed, while India is a major global 
producer and consumer of energy, it also faces huge suppressed demand for energy, 
with more than 400 million people lacking access to electricity and 700 million 
people depending on biomass for cooking fuel (IEA 2010). 
 
Yet the political thrust of India’s drive for ‘energy independency’ (Planning 
Commission 2006) is provided by the current energy supply-demand gaps and the 
huge increase in primary energy consumption required to meet economic growth 
targets of 8-10 per cent in the medium term. Reconciling climate change concerns 
with India’s economic growth will clearly require a significant transformation of the 
country’s energy supply. As India’s Integrated Energy Policy notes: ‘even if India 
somehow succeeds in raising the contribution of renewable energy by over 40 times 
by 2031-32…the contribution of renewables to our energy mix will not go beyond 
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5.6% of total energy required in 2031-32’ (Planning Commission 2006: 82). The 
current installed capacity for grid-interactive renewable energy is over 26GW, with 
government targets aiming to install an additional 74GW by 2022 (MNRE 2010; 
MNRE 2013). However, while India has put in place policies for scaling up ‘clean 
energy’1 power generation, there remains huge potential to scale up the use of 
renewable sources to meet both on- and off-grid energy needs and replace 
conventional energy sources. 
 
It is against this background that we situate our analysis of the politics and 
governance of clean energy in India and in particular the present and potential role of 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which currently constitutes the largest 
source of mitigation finance to the developing world (World Bank 2009). India has 
been one of the biggest recipients of CDM finance to date, hosting over 850 
registered projects (a fifth of the global total), but has faced criticism with respect to 
both dubious additionality of greenhouse gas emission reductions and weak 
contributions to sustainable development, the second objective that CDM projects 
are meant to achieve. Existing literature on the CDM has addressed issues such as 
the performance of specific technologies (e.g. Purohit & Michaelowa 2008), forms 
of technology transfer (Dechezleprêtre et al. 2008) and assessments of the 
sustainable development outcomes of projects (Castro & Benecke 2008). Other 
studies have considered particular characteristics of the Indian carbon market, 
including the prominence of unilateral projects (Krey 2005; Michaelowa 2007) or 
the functioning of India’s Designated National Authority (DNA) (Ganapati & Lui 
2009). More directly relevant to the broad governance approach taken in this paper, 
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some attention has also been directed to considering Indian ‘carbon governance’ in 
general (Benecke 2009).  
 
Less attention has been focused, however, on building a detailed understanding of 
the different levels of governance and the coalitions of actors and institutions which, 
we argue, influence the outcomes of India’s efforts to promote clean energy. 
Conceiving of clean energy governance in this broad manner means situating CDM 
projects and procedures within a wider set of political and economic power relations 
in the energy sector. This helps to advance an understanding of governance in 
practice: the role of power and politics in shaping clean energy governance, from 
global to local level, and across the spectrum of public and private initiatives and 
decision-making processes in India. To understand the exercise of power in practice 
beyond the formal division of responsibilities for energy policy means discussing the 
factors that impact upon actual decision-making and the outcomes of battles over 
bureaucratic authority, access to finance, or the balance of power between state and 
market actors. We therefore present an analysis informed by interviews with carbon 
market actors in India – government officials, market actors and their critics – as 
well us with many of the key regional and international institutions working on these 
issues in India.2  
 
The paper begins by outlining the regional and global influences that shape India’s 
clean energy sector: the governance of clean energy ‘from above’. It then turns to the 
governance of clean energy ‘from below’: the national politics of clean energy and 
the domestic power struggles in which international instruments such as the CDM 
become embroiled, and which they must engage if they are to make a significant 
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contribution to realizing India’s clean energy goals. We then outline areas of the ‘un-
governance’ of clean energy and locate this within the wider political economy of 
energy in India before offering some concluding thoughts.  
  
Providing an analysis of the politics underpinning governance arrangements in the 
energy sector means exploring the power of competing interest groups – those both 
directly involved in carbon markets and those influencing energy policy more 
broadly – that can resist, block or steer the CDM and its governance in particular 
directions. Scholars of energy transitions have referred to the alignments of actors 
and institutions with a stake in different energy futures in terms of ‘incumbent’ 
regimes organized around predominant socio-technical systems (such as fossil fuels) 
and ‘niches’ (such as particular types of renewable energy), which compete for  
resources and political support from state, private and other actors that populate the 
broader ‘landscape’ that impinges upon particular socio-technical systems (Geels 
2005; Verbong & Loorbach 2012). Scholars of ‘transitions management’, in 
particular, have called for approaches to move beyond a focus on institutional design 
and management issues and to address more fully the politics and non-politics of 
transitions (Scarse and Smith 2009; Meadowcroft 2009). This line of critique 
resonates with our attempt to go beyond conventional analysis of CDM governance 
as specific issues of institutional design, to the neglect of underlying questions of 
politics and power, and how these shape outcomes. We draw on the following 
notions of power to develop such an analysis of the role of the CDM in India’s 
energy politics: (i) structural and material power, which derives from control of 
resources, finance and production, but which might also extend to technological 
power (Falkner 2008). In this context, these forms of power apply to the corporations 
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whose production CDM finance seeks to shape; to technology providers; and to the 
international institutions that administer climate funds; (ii) bureaucratic and 
organizational power, which derives from access to and control over key sites of 
decision-making and here refers to the distribution of power and authority across 
state agencies with responsibilities for energy and climate change; and finally (iii) 
discursive power, or the power to shape framings of issues and the production of 
narratives, which is employed by a range of actors in making the case for and against 
the benefits brought about by the CDM and derives from access to media and key 
communication channels (cf. Levy & Newell 2005; Fuchs 2007). We describe below 
how these forms of power are mobilized to produce as well as frustrate change, and 
to maintain the power of incumbent actors, as we explore in the final section on the 
‘un-governance’ of clean development. 
 
Clean Energy Governance from Above 
 
This section consider actors and institutions beyond India’s borders that have a role 
in governing clean energy in India and the extent and ways in which these forms of 
‘governance from above’ shape and constrain India’s policy making process and 
policy autonomy (Newell et al. 2009). This resonates with what would be called 
‘landscape’ factors in the transitions literature mentioned above.   
 
Within the formal channels of the UNFCCC, India has been a leading voice of the 
G77+ China group in emphasizing that industrialized countries bear the historical 
responsibility for climate change and are obliged to act first to reduce their emissions 
and compensate countries such as India with finance for mitigation and adaptation 
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measures (Michel & Pandya 2009; Michealowa & Michaelowa 2011). This position 
is reflected in the country’s approach to the CDM and to Nationally Appropriate 
Mitigation Actions (NAMAs), which has sought to align carbon finance with 
national energy and industrial priorities rather than allow it to be used as a means of 
committing India to emissions reductions. For example, India has pushed for 
expansion of the project-based CDM to include large hydro power projects, nuclear 
power and forestry; for the removal of requirements to demonstrate the 
‘additionality’ of CDM finance for renewable energy projects; and for the use of 
public climate finance to meet the continued shortfall in demand for carbon credits in 
developed countries (MoEF 2009b).  
 
Yet while increasing international pressure on India has not been the primary driver 
of governmental action on clean energy, it has contributed to the formation of a 
powerful narrative around climate co-benefits for domestic actions de-linked from 
global commitments, behind which government, business and civil society interests 
have largely united (Dubash 2009). Through the CDM, India is engaging with 
international climate finance in ways that are geared towards aligning the scale up of 
clean energy with India’s domestic framing of climate policy. India’s Ministry of 
New and Renewable Energy has stated for example that adequate international 
finance through the CDM, NAMAs or other sources could double the ministry’s 
current renewable energy targets (Gupta 2010). 
 
Outside the intergovernmental negotiations on climate finance, India’s prosperous 
CDM market has made the country a site of significant flows of global public 
finance for energy. India has been the subject of ongoing capacity building programs 
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to develop its CDM governance from the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), Asian Development Bank (ADB) and German Technical Cooperation 
(GTZ, now GIZ), dating back to 2003 in the case of GIZ and 1999 in the case of a 
US capacity building programme (GTZ 2006). These programmes helped to 
institutionalize the CDM, address apparent market failures, and build the capacity of 
states, municipalities and private companies in developing projects, and are 
acknowledged by the Indian government to have been instrumental in initiating 
interest in the CDM beyond the DNA.3 Through this role, these institutions have 
steered the CDM in certain directions by addressing governance deficits in line with 
their respective expertise and interests, such as ADB efforts to increase the 
participation of the domestic finance sector and support projects within its financing 
rules; or GIZ actions to support projects with enhanced sustainable development 
benefits and to facilitate the sale of credits to German buyers.4  
 
The CDM is also supported in India through carbon funds operated for client 
companies by the ADB and International Finance Corporation (IFC), (the private 
sector lending arm of the World Bank Group). These funds co-finance projects 
upfront in exchange for a portion of the expected CERs (Certified Emissions 
Reductions) generated, performing market governance functions by providing price 
transparency and transferring the risk of non-delivery of credits away from buyers. 
Not all such efforts to shape the operation of carbon markets in India have been 
welcomed, however. The first of the World Bank’s carbon funds, the Prototype 
Carbon Fund (PCF), for example, received criticism for offering poor deals on the 
purchase of CERS in India and administering an overly-bureaucratic process.5  
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Despite the material power wielded by landscape actors through their control over 
clean energy finance, their power has been contested. India has sought to assert its 
policy autonomy in setting the terms of climate finance flows for energy by initially 
rejecting potential funds from the World Bank’s Climate Investment Funds, despite 
the country’s status as a ‘prominent potential client’ (Sethi 2008). Setting its 
preferred terms, India has since submitted a draft investment plan to the Bank’s 
Clean Technology Fund in 2011 (CIF 2011), prioritizing investments in, among 
other projects, a policy development loan for politically contentious changes to the 
streamlining of hydropower approval processes in Himachal Pradesh, where local 
citizens have expressed opposition to existing plans.  
 
Beyond carbon markets and climate finance, MDBs remain influential in shaping 
India’s energy sector, both through the loans they extend and through the 
transmission of global norms of finance allocation, management and ownership; 
creating or altering political relationships of power between the recipients and 
providers of capital. Financial crises and calls for climate-sensitive energy financing 
have provided MDBs with strategic opportunities to re-engage with energy financing 
in Asia, where industrializing countries otherwise become less dependent on MDBs 
to meet project financing requirements. Within this context, MDBs have begun to 
increase the proportion of their core concessional and private sector finance for clean 
energy projects (BNEF 2010).  
 
However, alongside its support for ‘clean’ energy, public energy finance to India 
continues to provide significant financing for fossil fuel exploitation. For example, 
the ADB and IFC are both part-financing the first of India’s Ultra Mega Power 
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projects (UMPPs), the $4.1 billion, 4000MW Mundra coal power plant project in 
Gujarat,6 citing the use of more efficient supercritical technology as a key investment 
criterion. The CDM Executive Board rejected Tata’s Mundra project on the grounds 
of additionality, but has approved a number of similar projects such as Reliance 
Power’s UMPPs at Sasan and Krishnapatnam (Fisher 2009; IFC 2008), drawing 
criticism about methodological weaknesses in assessment and raising broader issues 
about the use of CDM finance for minor improvements in coal power plant 
efficiency (Lazarus & Chandler 2011). The effect of such support from the CDM and 
World Bank is to entrench the bureaucratic power of the incumbent coal regime in 
India centered in the Ministries of Power and Coal at the expense of the Ministry of 
New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) which aims instead to lever international 
finance to shift the country’s energy fix in favour of ‘clean’ energy as described 
above. 
 
Despite the existence then of a broad range of international initiatives aimed at 
promoting clean energy, levels of international finance for clean energy remain 
inadequate compared to the scale of the energy challenge in India and contradictory 
in their effects with simultaneous support for fossil fuel and renewable energy 
development. We will now explore how the impact and effectiveness of ‘Clean 
energy governance from above’ and its ability to reconfigure energy governance in 
India is ultimately affected by the national and sub-national political processes that 
mediate and shape it.  
 
Clean Energy Governance from Below: The National Governance of Clean 
Energy in India 
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India’s system of national governance has had a decisive influence over the direction 
of clean energy development and over the role of the CDM in supporting clean 
energy in the country.  The growth of renewable energy in India has been generated 
largely by the private sector, not through CDM finance, but by a regulatory 
framework and series of incentives created by the state positioning itself as the 
enabler of private investment. India’s Five Year Plans and various policy ‘missions’ 
such as the National Solar Mission are based on a model of state-led development 
that dates from the era of Nehru. The majority of corporate finance has thus far 
focused on mature markets in large scale wind installations and commercially viable 
hydro projects (MNRE 2010), with the wind industry benefiting from a regulatory 
framework provided by central government and a series of financial and fiscal 
incentives provided by states, including feed-in-tariffs, accelerated depreciation, tax 
exemptions and low interest loans (Rao & Kishore 2009). 
 
The result is that for several successful sectors of clean energy technology mature 
markets and significant capabilities exist (Lema & Lema 2012), such that renewable 
energy projects in India are increasingly attractive to investors on a risk return basis, 
independent of carbon finance. Contrary to the intended role of CDM finance as a 
driver of investment in renewable energy, the range of incentives provided by the 
Indian state, central planning and enthusiasm for domestic trading initiatives7 mean 
that the promise of CDM revenue provides the ‘icing on the cake’ or a 
‘psychological boost’ as project developers put it,8 but rarely drives investment 
decisions. Many critics of the CDM in India have referred to a US Consulate cable 
leaked in 2011 as confirmation of a widely held belief that the process of 
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additionality calculation in practice involves more complex calculations of financial 
risk and return than belies the formal process (Schiermeier 2011). Given the long 
lead times inherent in the international CDM approval system, project developers 
feel that relying on CDM finance represents a highly risky business strategy. Rather, 
the suggestion of carbon market actors in India is that government policies to 
facilitate the uptake of renewable energy mean that, in practice, the CDM has come 
to play an additional, supplementary role in incentivizing projects and shaping their 
viability, rather than a decisive one. 
 
We find a mixture of public and private power at work here consistent with other 
work on the CDM’s ‘hybrid’ governance model (Streck 2004). While the CDM 
Executive Board ultimately approves projects and issues credits based on judgments 
about the additionality of projects, project developers and their consultants exercise a 
degree of power about which projects are selected, and whether they are considered 
worthy of support through their judgments about the financial viability of projects. 
These include the preparation of distinct cases of financial viability for domestic and 
international sources of finance.9 The private sector’s assessments of India’s 
attractiveness for renewable energy investment also wield considerable discursive 
power, constructing India as a positive place to invest and in doing so shaping flows 
of finance. For example, when HSBC greets the planned release of a report outlining 
how India plans to meet its energy intensity target by ‘upgrad[ing] the country’s 
climate strategy rating to positive’ (Knight et al. 2010), it governs the market that it 
describes by shaping investor perceptions and ultimately the distribution of finance. 
The power of business groups also enters the picture as initiators and shapers of a 
particular type of ‘open’ CDM governance. Lobbying by Indian businesses was 
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important in shifting the Indian government position on market mechanisms to one 
that embraced the prospect of the CDM and led to the early establishment of the 
DNA in 2003 (Michaelowa & Michaelowa 2011). A variety of international 
consultants have served as market enablers by utilizing existing networks of clients 
and partnering with local technical consultants to promote project development and 
influence the direction of early CDM investment towards particular sectors (Pulver 
& Benny 2010). In the case of Price waterhouse Coopers (PwC), they also stand 
accused of being implicated in the promotion of non-additional projects (Michaelwa 
& Purohit 2007), undermining the integrity of emission reductions. Industry lobbies 
such as the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and the Federation of Indian 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) have also played a part as market 
facilitators by generating demand and raising awareness of CDM opportunities for 
Indian companies. 
 
Private actors also enact CDM governance through the less formal, everyday acts of 
governance performed through the seemingly technocratic but inherently political 
exercises of auditing, monitoring and accounting for emissions reductions and 
sustainable development benefits (Lovell & MacKenzie 2011). The private 
governance functions performed by Designated Operational Entities (DOEs) have 
received a great deal of attention in India, due to both the high degree of formal 
authority they are delegated (Green 2008) and the common perception that their poor 
performance has caused delays in project validation and emissions auditing. Due in 
part to capacity constraints, the DNA is heavily reliant on the assessments of DOEs. 
This is problematic in light of claims that certain DOEs are reluctant to visit the sites 
of projects to validate stakeholder consultations, which in some cases have presented 
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duplicate ‘cut and paste’ comments in PDDs for separate projects (CSE 2005). 
Hence while efforts to make information about projects held in PDDs more publicly 
available are important, they do not detract from the potential for serious 
shortcomings in the quality and reliability of the information contained in them. Nor 
do they compensate for poorly conducted consultation processes about the impact of 
projects, as we discuss below. The technical expertise required to make sense of the 
documents, produced not for public consumption, but to seek approval from 
governments and the EB, means they are often in reality inaccessible or intelligible 
to communities expected to host projects.   
 
Beyond the governance of claimed emissions reductions, what then is the role of the 
Indian government in overseeing the delivery of the other aim of the CDM, to bring 
sustainable development benefits? The state in India has played a notably less active 
role in governing and steering the CDM than in other areas of the energy economy. 
The DNA is responsible for ensuring that sustainable development benefits are 
integrated into the design of each CDM project. Pressure over the high rejection rate 
of Indian projects by the Executive Board has reportedly led to a tightening of the 
host country approval process regarding the financial ‘additionality’ of projects 
(Benecke 2009) but to date the Government of India has opted not to enforce ‘hard’ 
regulations such as taxation regimes, a floor price for CERs, or differential fees in 
line with priority sectors. Indeed, the Indian DNA’s broad sustainable development 
criteria and decision-making in practice appear geared more towards ensuring a 
smooth domestic approval process for project developers than ensuring the integrity 
of sustainable development outcomes.10 Late in the day, in 2012, the Indian DNA 
dictated that large scale projects should commit to sharing 2 per cent of CER revenue 
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with local communities, partly in response to sustained criticism of the contribution 
of CDM projects to sustainable development,. While this makes a (small) 
contribution to the redistribution of benefits deriving from CDM projects, sharing 
revenue on this scale is unlikely  to shift the calculus of investors in CDM projects 
about the level of benefits they are expected to provide.  
 
Thus, India currently presents more of a case of market-enabling governance for, 
rather than governance of the carbon market. Studies of the perspectives of 
companies on the CDM approval process for example indicate that firms perceive 
there to be a low risk of project rejection by the Indian DNA (Hultman et al. 2012), 
reinforcing concerns that project approval proceeds with little scrutiny and few 
checks about whether CDM projects are likely to deliver claimed sustainable 
development benefits or avoid harm for local stakeholders.11 Critics have claimed 
that the failure of governance in relation to sustainable development has resulted in 
negative social and environmental effects associated with particular projects 
including detrimental health and environmental effects, and loss of livelihoods 
(Böhm & Dabhi 2009). Likewise, domestic industrial projects that receive support 
from MDBs have provided focal points for activists documenting the shortfalls 
against the environmental and social investment guidelines of MDBs. Activists have 
used global networks and online media to expose cases of alleged ‘carbon fraud’ 
(dubious project additionality) and ‘climate colonialism’, where people are 
dispossessed of their land by foreign actors. In governance terms the effect of this 
watchdog activism is to force responses from the DNA and from project developers, 
a small proportion of whom in India have sought to establish the credibility of their 
projects by seeking certification from the Gold Standard Foundation. The Gold 
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Standard provides an extra set of process checks and requirements on the fulfillment 
of sustainable development criteria, though the associated transaction costs have 
been considered too great for some project developers even where they consider 
themselves compliant with Gold Standard norms.12 
 
The Role of States in Clean Energy Governance  
 
Given the light touch steering role adopted by the DNA, it does not currently have 
the decisive role in governing the CDM within India envisaged by formal CDM 
governance structures. Governance at state and local level also has a key role to play 
in determining the extent to which benefits flow from the CDM. This is reflected in 
the uneven distribution of CDM projects and revenue within India, where Tamil 
Nadu, Maharashtra, Karnataka and Rajastan each have over 200 projects at 
validation stage, while several other states host no projects at all (Fenhann 2012). 
While economically prosperous states have generally seen greater CDM investment 
than poorer ones (Sirohi 2007), ‘good governance’ also appears important since 
these same states are those that generate confidence among investors based on 
perceived respect for the rule of law and property rights and having an attractive 
investment climate. 
 
Several states that have attracted CDM projects have also created single window 
clearance systems and CDM promotional centers in order to create an enabling 
policy environment. In other states, CERS were shared with the electricity grid 
operators that transmit the power generated by independent power producers, 
reducing the financial incentive for project developers.13 However, considering that 
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CDM revenue alone is rarely if ever sufficient to initiate project development, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that the biggest winners have been states such as Gujarat and 
Tamil Nadu with established industrial sectors and attractive policies and governance 
arrangements to facilitate private investment in energy (Benecke 2010). In contrast, 
there has been a perception in some states that, as a market mechanism, the CDM 
‘would be taken care of by industry’.14 Many states lack the capacity to promote and 
process CDM projects. The experience of state bureaucrats suggests that the 
promotion of renewable energy and the CDM at state level is often driven by 
motivated individuals rather than institutionalized processes.15 Indeed, there is great 
variability in institutional capacity across states, as well as between the actual roles 
and functions that analogous state authorities perform. From the perspective of 
project developers, the division of responsibility for approving and overseeing 
projects is not always clear.16 Presented with incomplete information and 
uncertainty, developers’ perceptions of effective governance can therefore also be 
important in directing the geographical distribution of investment.  
 
Local Governance 
 
Beyond the national and state structures that direct CDM investment, the distribution 
of sustainable development benefits among citizens is mediated by local institutions, 
in so far as CDM projects (like other proposed industrial development projects) are 
required to hold local consultations with affected stakeholders prior to 
implementation. The distribution of benefits (e.g. job creation, access to technology, 
or improvements in local air quality) is often at the heart of discussions about 
proposed projects. Local governance is decisive in determining who gains from 
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particular projects, and the extent to which certain projects are endorsed or resisted at 
the local level. Who gains from particular projects is shaped by the nature of 
consultation processes, the capacity of local institutions to engage with them, their 
political power to (re)shape the design of projects (since project developers have to 
provide an account of how they have addressed any issues raised during the 
consultations), and whose interests they pursue in such spaces of participation.  
 
Political decentralization in India has opened space for local institutions to play a 
greater role in mediating between project developers, the state and citizens, 
providing a means for people to participate in policy making through institutions 
with the sort of permanent and visible presence in local political life that cannot be 
achieved by central or state bodies. However, precisely because the Panchayat Raj 
system of local institutions has been delegated greater responsibility for running a 
range of local affairs, they often have little capacity to take on the additional 
responsibility for oversight of CDM consultations. For example, quarterly meetings 
of the Gram Sabha17 mean that discussion can often only focus on a single issue, 
such as the government’s rural employment guarantee scheme. Given the limited 
regulatory oversight of the claimed sustainable development benefits by the DNA, it 
is perhaps not surprising that reports of lax procedures on the part of project 
developers in engaging local stakeholders are commonplace. These include one-off 
invitations to consultation meetings issued in English language newspapers, in areas 
where the language is rarely spoken or a significant proportion of residents are not 
literate. 
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Moreover, local institutions are not immune to corruption or capture of consultative 
processes by local elites and often have weak systems of accountability in place for 
the management of revenue and project benefits. For example, the wind turbine 
producer Suzlon has made allegations of corruption among state and local officials 
while attempting to secure the necessary community approval for India’s largest 
wind farm.18 However, the time and effort required to initiate projects with strong 
deliberative decision making and cross-community support can result in 
prohibitively high transaction costs in the eyes of CDM investors and project 
developers, limiting the prospects for demand-led projects at community scale. 
While some of these issues stem from the fundamental design of the CDM, given its 
process requirements, governance by India’s national, state and local institutions 
significantly shapes whether CDM projects produce the social and development 
benefits promised and where and to whom the benefits are distributed. 
 
A series of interventions from public and private actors have attempted to address 
some of the governance challenges outlined above by promoting a stable investment 
environment through improvements in the rule of law and increased institutional 
capacity and coordination. Promoting the ‘good governance’ of CDM (Chapman 
2011) is important given that lack of capacity presents a significant constraint for the 
DNA, which is sometimes required to review fifty to sixty PDDs in each monthly 
sitting; and for the ministries on the approval committee, which typically have little 
technical knowledge of the CDM itself.19 These programs are well supported by 
international donors, particularly those with interests in market-led development and 
the success of the CDM as a carbon offset mechanism. GIZ, for example, has 
attempted to improve the administrative performance of the DNA by introducing a 
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paperless application process and has responded to criticisms of consultation 
procedures by collecting photo and video evidence of community participation in 
projects that it supports. This constitutes an improvement on the short descriptions of 
consultation processes provided in PDDs which the EB requires to be made publicly 
available. However, while these efforts address the efficiency and effectiveness of 
core CDM procedures, they fail to locate the distribution of CDM benefits and costs 
in the broader context of politics and the relations of power that influence the CDM 
and that we describe below. 
  
The Political Economy of Clean Energy in India 
 
In this section we discuss how the national governance of the CDM and clean energy 
is profoundly affected by the broader political economy of energy in India in which 
powerful coalitions of interests seek to shape India’s energy future and – directly and 
indirectly – the role of the CDM within it. Although ongoing market-based reforms 
of energy governance are planned in India, the energy sector as a whole retains a 
high level of state influence (Joseph 2010). As described above, with regard to 
carbon markets and renewable energy the most significant role of the state has been 
in setting enabling policies, rules and procedures for private sector finance and 
technology development. But a broader set of political dynamics within the state 
impact upon these policy areas. Considering renewable energy specifically, new 
policy initiatives such as the Renewable Energy Certificate Scheme may continue to 
be affected by governance issues experienced in the enforcement of Renewable 
Purchase Obligations for State Electricity Regulatory Commissions (SERCs), where 
a combination of turf wars, lack of administrative competence, capacity constraints, 
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and entrenched political interests have resulted in poor implementation in several 
states and produced unstable and unpredictable policies (ADB 2008). In this context, 
navigating CDM governance presents just one of a set of political challenges for 
investors affected by policies on land, state level clearances, renewable energy 
tariffs, and grid connections. 
 
At the local level too, CDM financing enters India’s national and local energy policy 
landscape in the context of ongoing discontent with consultative and participatory 
processes around development and infrastructure projects. The Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) process has been repeatedly criticized for failing to allow 
involvement of affected citizens in the scoping stage of project design, opting instead 
for public hearings based on the completed EIA, a similar process to the majority of 
CDM project consultations (Mahalingham et al. 2006). Although policies such as the 
Electricity Act of 2003 have allowed for greater opportunities for civil society input 
to policy, the dynamics of the power sector can prove to be complex and the range of 
organizations able to engage with the social and environmental assessments of 
electricity policies on behalf of civil society is limited and uneven (Mahalingham et 
al. 2006). Likewise, some local NGOs and civil society organizations such as Carbon 
Market Watch are actively engaged in monitoring selected CDM projects. But their 
capacity to critically monitor the environmental and social planning of India’s large 
number of CDM projects is limited. Hence while the democratic space for local and 
national engagement with the CDM is greater in India than other major host 
countries such as China, accountability cannot be provided through these institutions 
alone in a large, diffuse and complex market, such as the CDM in India. In the 
absence of mechanisms to monitor project outcomes, assumptions regarding the 
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compensating presence of an engaged and well-resourced civil society are 
problematic. 
 
These and other features of India’s contemporary political economy shape how and 
where CDM investment goes and who benefits at a variety of scales. In the short 
term, many of the most accessible sites for on-shore wind projects in India, 
encouraged by the sorts of policies we have analyzed above, are situated in forested 
or ‘tribal’ areas. Land acquisition is a contentious issue, referred to by some in the 
investment community as a ‘long, tedious and often opaque business’ underpinned 
by ‘a huge amount of murky political economy’ (Kadakia & Acharya 2010: 15). 
Indeed, many conventional energy generation projects are said to have been delayed 
on these grounds, making renewable energy a particularly attractive political option 
where land is available and the transfer of its use is less contentious, such as for solar 
power installations in desert states (MNRE 2010). Yet as Narain (2011) notes, strong 
institutions and procedures for meaningful public participation help to create a 
credible governance process that mitigates the risks faced by investors. A 
constructive approach may call for a greater consideration of procedural issues in 
CDM and energy policy-making, and recognition of their importance in determining 
for whom energy policy is designed and to whom the benefits and potential trade-
offs of energy development are distributed. 
 
Indeed, creating an enabling environment for renewable energy is deeply politicized 
when considering the potential trade-offs of providing the ‘long, loud and legal’ 
market signals demanded by investors (Hamilton 2009). Among current government 
initiatives, the National Solar Mission creates perhaps the clearest example of 
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political challenges in constructing long term policies for clean energy, and the 
challenges of maximizing the value of additional international climate finance. The 
Solar Mission is contentious due to its costs, as it proposes to step outside of the 
dominant co-benefits framing of clean energy in India, at least in the short to 
medium term. Questions of who will bear the cost of solar electricity tariffs and 
decentralized energy distribution, and how the costs will be managed, are foremost 
in determining the short and long term success of a policy that could put India in a 
strong political position with respect to clean energy technology manufacturing and 
distribution,20notwithstanding the tensions this has generated with the US at the 
World Trade Organization (Politi 2013). The governance of this rapidly emerging 
policy area will be critical to determining in which ways climate finance, including 
the CDM, will contribute to its realization or increased ambition. The role of the 
CDM would be quite different for example depending on whether it continues to 
provide additional finance or solar hardware, or whether it is used to develop the 
foundations of technological skills, knowledge and capabilities among firms and 
communities. While the CDM is not designed or positioned to transform domestic 
political interests, the political economy of energy in India will likely shape how the 
limited and variable flows of CDM finance will need to be governed in order to 
engage national processes and existing political interests, if it is to have a 
transformative effect on the adoption of renewable energy in the Indian context.  
 
The ‘Un-governance’ of Clean Development 
 
We have highlighted above the international, national and sub-national level 
institutions and actors that – in various modes and capacities – govern the role that 
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the CDM and clean energy have come to play in expanding India’s energy 
generation capacity. Yet it is as important to consider the un-governance of clean 
energy in India as it is to assess the institutions that assume formal responsibility for 
governing clean energy. We use the term ‘un-governance’ to refer to areas of 
deliberate and active neglect, where power is exercised to ensure action is not taken 
and prevailing material and bureaucratic interests protected (cf. Crenson 1971).  In 
this context it entails recognition that the actors and institutions with primary 
responsibility for clean energy development are rarely those actors which yield most 
power over the course of energy policy development. It manifests itself in the way 
the incumbent regime, largely centered around the continued use of fossil fuels, 
accommodates niche initiatives on clean energy without reducing its position of 
power within India’s energy regime.  
 
Instances of un-governance or deliberate neglect become most apparent in cases 
where plans for renewable energy generation or enhanced environmental concern 
begin to imply limits on fossil energy development. This tends to occur only in the 
rare cases when clean energy measures are positioned outside of the dominant 
discursive framing of clean energy ‘co-benefits’ in India. Hence, while India’s much 
feted MNRE is the only ministry in the world dedicated solely to renewable energy 
and has seen large budgetary increases over recent years (Planning Commission 
2010), the financial allocation for renewable energy remains small in comparison to 
total energy allocation which continues to favor the incumbent coal regime. 
Moreover, the decision to form a National Clean Energy Fund from a tax on 
domestic and imported coal21, which might appear as a loss for coal interests, has 
been considered by some observers to be politically feasible only because the 
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revenue collected is essentially small enough to constitute no real threat to the coal 
industry.22  
 
The Ministries of Power and Coal command much greater financial resources and 
political power within government than either MNRE or MoEF. When former 
Minister of Environment and Forests Jairam Ramesh began to enforce previously 
perfunctory procedures on environmental clearances for proposed industrial and 
energy developments, it aroused significant disquiet among more powerful 
ministries involved in energy policy who characterized his position as ‘anti-business’ 
(Ramesh 2010). While staff in MNRE in particular are keen to utilize the CDM to 
support greater ambition in the development of policies such as the National Solar 
Mission,23 the CDM does not garner significant interest from the Ministry of Power 
(MoP) despite the significant proportion of India’s CERs generated from India’s 
capital intensive large coal power plants.24 Indeed, the prominent industrial 
developers of such projects are largely those with the capacity to engage with CDM 
procedures and accounting exercises, such that state steering or sectoral prioritization 
of the CDM may appear of little relevance to powerful ministries such as the MoP. 
Any potential prioritization of particular energy service needs for poverty alleviation, 
or particular technologies and associated knowledge that might strengthen Indian 
industry expertise would, in effect, challenge this ability of existing political interests 
to benefit from climate finance. And whilst the MNRE may provide avenues of 
stakeholder engagement (however imperfect) for promoting low carbon, pro-poor 
energy technologies, there is no evidence to suggest that the Ministry of Power is 
obliged to include MNRE within its decision making on policies that affect the 
power sector (Mahalingham et al., 2006). 
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In light of the differential power among energy ministries, India’s Planning 
Commission – the coordinating body for Five Year Plans and ‘holistic’ energy 
planning exercises such as the Integrated Energy Policy – has a potentially important 
role in steering Indian energy policies towards simultaneously addressing climate 
change and energy poverty concerns. For example, in preparation for the country’s 
next Five Year Plan (2012-2017), the Planning Commission was tasked with 
preparing a roadmap for inclusive low carbon growth, including how the government 
may meet its carbon intensity target. Yet the Planning Commission is not deemed to 
have the authority nor the mechanisms to enforce change in the relevant ministries, 
or to ensure coherence between them (Dubash 2011). Its ability to unsettle existing 
power relations remains in doubt therefore. Alongside national policies that 
specifically address clean energy growth, the nature of these power relations in the 
energy sector in India play a critical role in determining how India will govern clean 
energy and how carbon and climate finance will be received into the political 
economy of energy in India over the coming years. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Our analysis has sought to highlight the role of politics, power and political economy 
in understanding how and whether schemes such as the CDM are capable of 
producing social and development benefits while levering additional sources of clean 
energy finance in India. In so doing it has added to, and gone beyond, an 
understanding of a narrower set of state-based governance factors such as capacity, 
efficiency and accountability explored by existing studies. Although some of the 
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governance factors that influence the performance of the CDM are determined by the 
structural design of the mechanism itself, we have argued that in the case of India, 
‘governance from below’ by a multitude of actors and institutions at national, state 
and local level shapes how and whether benefits flow from the CDM to their 
intended beneficiaries. Future interventions, if they are to be effective in producing 
large-scale change, need to understand, engage and ultimately unsettle this broader 
political terrain. 
 
The approach to examining governance presented here has included the governing 
roles of a range of actors across the public-private spectrum; across scales from 
village institutions to global institutions; and including both formal institutions and 
the informal practices of day to day governance. Using this wide definition, we have 
considered how the power and influence over energy policy-making and 
administrative procedures concerning the CDM has impacted upon the creation and 
design of CDM governance, who influences decisions at national and local levels, 
and therefore who benefits from clean energy financing. These processes in turn 
shape how significant a role ‘clean energy’ initiatives including the CDM come to 
play in India’s energy regime. Far from being technocratic or purely managerial 
issues (Bhattacharyya 2010), decision-making about the bankability and financial 
viability of projects, the degree of integration of clean energy initiatives within 
overall state energy strategies, and decisions about who has the right to participate in 
decisions about projects and policy, are aspects of governance that are highly 
political by virtue of their importance in directing and shaping the flows of 
international and domestic clean energy finance and the associated benefits and 
trade-offs. This, we argue, is critical for understanding the ‘governance in practice’ 
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of market-based mechanisms such as the CDM. Here in particular, the ‘un-
governance’ of clean energy often has significant impacts on whether or not clean 
energy goals are achieved: the actors and policy processes that are not typically 
perceived as the subjects of clean energy governance but which can undermine the 
effect of clean energy policies, through ongoing investments in fossil fuels and 
directing of flows of foreign finance towards that end. 
 
India’s early state-led growth in clean energy technologies has largely dictated the 
role that the CDM has come to play in the country. In this regard, the extent to which 
the CDM can fulfill its dual aims of creating sustainable development benefits 
alongside emissions reductions is dependent on the broader institutional environment 
and political economy of energy policy and the relations of power which characterize 
the domestic energy sector. In turn, we argue that this implies an appreciation of how 
the influence and power of ‘incumbent’ versus ‘niche’ actors, for example, shapes 
the extent to which national policy is steered towards particular public goals and 
reflects  certain interests over others in attempts to simultaneously address climate 
change, energy poverty and energy security. We have argued here for greater 
appreciation in scholarship and policy making of the role that national and local 
energy governance and politics plays in determining whether the CDM becomes 
aligned with domestic clean energy politics and, ultimately, in shaping its prospects 
for contributing to low carbon energy transitions in industrializing countries such as 
India. 
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1 In this paper we consider energy generation defined as ‘clean’ through the CDM and through 
various aspects of Indian energy policy, while recognising that definitions of clean energy are 
contested (Newell et al. 2009). 
2 The paper is based on 36 semi-structured interviews and a series of meetings during September 2010 
with a range of Delhi-based policy makers and bureaucrats in relevant government ministries and 
authorities, project developers, consultants, private foundations, financiers, representatives of various 
bilateral and multilateral donors, and representatives of non-governmental organisations and civil 
society (Appendix 1). Interviewee data has been triangulated prior to interpretation in order to assess 
the validity of claims. 
3 Authors’ interview with Member Secretary of DNA, MOEF, New Delhi, September 2010  
4 Authors’ interview with GIZ representative, India Carbon Market Conclave 2010, New Delhi, 
September 2010. 
5 Authors’ interviews with a carbon market services consultant; and with a Director, MNRE, New 
Delhi, September 2010. 
6 Both ADB and IFC are providing $450m of debt finance to the project, with IFC providing a further 
$50m in equity. 
7 In addition to the REC scheme, the most significant of these is the Perform, Achieve and Trade 
(PAT) scheme for trade in energy efficiency measures, which came into force during August 2012. 
Pilot schemes are also planned for the introduction of domestic trade in sulphur- and nitrogen-based 
industrial air pollutants (Singh 2011). 
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8 Authors’ interviews with private, public and third sector project developers, New Delhi, September 
2010.  
9 Authors’ interviews with carbon market consultants and project developers, New Delhi, September 
2010. 
10 Authors’ interview with Member Secretary of the DNA, MoEF, New Delhi, September 2010 
11 Authors’ interviews with carbon market consultants and project developers, New Delhi, September 
2010. 
12Authors’ interviews with Programme Manager, Gold Standard Foundation, New Delhi; Project 
Developers, Carbon Market Conclave 2010, New Delhi; Senior Program Officer of an international 
NGO and former staff member in the Maharashtra State Government, Gurgaon, September 2010. 
13 We thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this point. 
14Authors’ interview with Senior Program Officer of an international NGO and former staff member 
in the Maharashtra State Government, Gurgaon, September 2010. 
15 Authors’ interview with Senior Program Officer of an international NGO and former staff member 
in the Maharashtra State Government, Gurgaon, September 2010. 
16 Authors’ Interview with Senior Climate Finance Advisor, DfID, New Delhi, September 2011. 
17 Gram Sabha is a village assembly open to all citizens. 
18 Authors’ interview with Deputy Marketing Manager, Suzlon, New Delhi, September 2010. 
19 Authors’ interview with senior staff member, Social, Environment and Water Resources 
Management Unit, World Bank, New Delhi, September 2010. 
20 The MNRE cites Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) data that suggests that India’s 
target of 15 per cent of renewable energy in the electricity mix can be met without additional costs to 
the end-user, with additional costs borne by state electricity utilities (Gupta 2010). 
21 A $1.1 per tonne tax was placed on coal in the 2010 budget. 
22 Authors’ interview with Director, MNRE, New Delhi, September 2010. 
23 Interview with Director of MNRE, New Delhi, September 2010 
24 Interview with Director in the Ministry of Power, New Delhi, September 2010 
 
Appendix 1 – List of interviewee institutions 
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Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) 
CDM Designated National Authority (DNA), MoEF 
Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) 
Planning Commission 
Central Electricity Authority (CEA) 
former staff  of Maharashtra State government 
Ministry of Power 
Bureau of Energy Efficiency (BEE), Ministry of Power 
Former international climate change negotiator for Indian delegation 
Carbon market consultants 
Suzlon 
Project developers – public, private and third sector 
Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) 
Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI)  
Gold Standard Foundation 
Centre for Science and Environment 
Winrock International 
The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI) 
Centre for Policy Research (CPR) 
Integrated Research and Action for Development (IRADe) 
WWF 
Research for Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) 
GTZ (now GIZ) 
UK Department for International Development (DfID) 
World Bank: Social, Environment and Water Resources Management Unit, 
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Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP) 
 
 
